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Domestic Relations-Divorce-Separation By Mutual Consent
Since 1907, when the North Carolina legislature first enabled a
husband and wife to be divorced after a specified period of separation,
the question of whether it is necessary for both parties to consent to
the separation has been an area of special confusion. The first separation statute was passed in 1907 and provided for absolute divorce
after a 10-year separation.1 The first case to be decided under this
statute was Cooke v. Cooke.2 The court used broad language in
that case, stating that the plaintiff need not be the injured party and
that the separation need not be based on mutual consent of the parties.
The next two cases' retreated somewhat from the broad language of
the Cooke decision, and held that the party at fault could not seek a
divorce under the statute. This resulted from a codification of the
statutes which placed the statute in question under a heading which
provided that only the injured party could maintain an action. Immediately after these cases, the legislature passed what is now G.S.
§ 50-6 in 1931.1 The new statute provided that a divorce would be
granted on application of either party. The first case decided directly
under G.S. § 50-6 held that the plaintiff could get a divorce though
he was not the injured party.5
In 1936 the court decided Parkerv. Parker.' The plaintiff had
been guilty of willful abandonment, but had left his wife without any
deed of separation or mutual agreement. The court denied his
divorce because there was no mutual consent. The court construed
the clause in the statute providing that the separation must be "by
deed of separation or otherwise" to mean "by deed of separation or

'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 50-5 (4) (1950).

N.C. 272, 80 S.E. 178 (1913).
'Lee v. Lee, 182 N.C. 61, 108 S.E. 352 (1921); Sanderson v. Sanderson,
178 N.C. 339, 100 S.E. 590 (1919). When the statutes were codified, the
old statute was placed under the heading, "The party injured may bring an
action for absolute divorce." Separation thus became the fourth listed reason
under the new codification.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 72.
'Long v. Long, 206 N.C. 706, 175 S.E. 85 (1934). Two years later the
North Carolina court reverted again to the position that willful abandonment would bar a plaintiff's action for divorce under the statute, on the
basis that the statute had only been re-enacted. Brown v. Brown, 213 N.C.
347, 196 S.E. 333 (1938). The scope of this note is confined to the problem
of mutual consent. For a discussion of the problem of the inability of a
party guilty of willful abandonment to sue for divorce under the North
statute, see Annot., 166 A.L.R. 498 (1947).
separation
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264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936).
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otherwise by mutual consent." Hyder v. Hyder7 followed in the
same year and the court reaffirmed the Parker holding. The legislature reacted swiftly and decisively. In 1937 the reference to "deed
of separation or otherwise" was deleted from the statute, leaving the
statute in its present form.8
When Byers v. Byers' was decided in 1942, the court seemed
to follow the lead of the legislature. Plaintiff proved that he was
not guilty of willful abandonment, though he had walked out on his
wife, and that he had provided for her since his departure. The
court granted his divorce and indicated that the statutory change
had in effect overruled Parker. The court stated that in Parkerthe
term "separation" was construed too narrowly, and that the legislature had sought to avoid this in the future by completely deleting
the phrase. The court also said that since the world "separation"
was not mentioned the legislature evidently did not intend that that
word, along with its doctrinal implications, be a prerequisite to an
action for divorce under the statute. In regard to mutual consent,
the court stated: "There must be at least an intention on the part of
one of the parties to cease cohabitation, and this must be shown to
have existed at the time alleged as the beginning of the separation
period; it must appear that the separation is with that definite purpose on the part of at least one of the parties."' 0 After the Byers
case, there followed a line of four cases which either expressly or
impliedly upheld the position of the court in Byers that the intent of
one of the parties was sufficient under the statute."
Moody v. Moody' 2 is the latest authority on the subject of mutual
consent. In this case, the defendant husband had suffered a head
injury. He and the plaintiff had separated and remained separate
(1936)."Marriages may be dissolved and the
798
ch. 100:
parties thereto be divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application
187 1937,
S.E.
8"210
Laws
Sess.486,
N.C.N.C.

of either party; if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and
apart for two years .... "
8222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).
'Old. at 304.
"Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C. 654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951); Young v.
Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80,
33 S.E.2d 492 (1945) ; Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E. 2d 444
(1943). But see Williams v. Williams, 224 N.C. 91, 29 S.E.2d 39 (1944),
which seems out of line with the other decisions in that the court held there
that there was no mutual consent because the defendant was mentally incapable of assenting, and denied a divorce. However, the plaintiff alleged
consent in this case.
on mutual
and reliedN.C.
752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).
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and apart for over two years. Plaintiff brought her action under
G.S. § 50-6, and a demurrer was sustained in the trial court. The
supreme court affirmed, holding that there must be voluntary mutual
consent to separate under the statute or no action may be maintained.
The Moody case adds little but confusion to the law on the subject and represents a departure from Byers and the line of cases
following it. In the first place, an agreement made by the parties
before the husband suffered his injury was only cursorily mentioned
and thereafter disregarded. The only reason given for this was that
the plaintiff had only intended to separate from the date of the
injury.
The court discussed at length the "insanity" factor, and cited
Lawson v. Bennett' 3 as authority. In that case, plaintiff brought
his action under G.S. § 50-6. Plaintiff's wife was insane and confined in an institution. The court denied his divorce and held that
the remedy of G.S. § 50-5(6)," 4 which provides for divorce after
five years of separation when one spouse is incurably insane and confined in a mental institution, was exclusive in such cases. It is not
argued that this statute should not be exclusive where it applies.
But it is clear that in the Moody case the plaintiff could not possibly
maintain an action under G.S. § 50-5 (6) because the defendant was
not insane nor confined in a mental institution; he was merely incompetent. These two things (incurable insanity and confinement)
are prerequisites for a G.S. § 50-5 (6) action and the court has so
held. 5 The result is that since the plaintiff could not sue under G.S.
§ 50-6 or under G.S. § 50-5 (6), she has no statutory remedy in this
state and is forced to remain married for life to a man from whom
she has long been separated."
The court in Moody relied mainly on the fact that the husband
was incompetent and therefore unable to form an intent to separate.
The intent of the wife standing alone was not enough. The court
apparently ignored the clear language of the Byers case and those
following it, and the rather obvious legislative intent expressed when
the General Assembly deleted "by deed of separation or otherwise"
from the statute.
" 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 162 (1954).
"'N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (6) (Supp. 1961).
"5Mabry v. Mabry, 243 N.C. 126, 90 S.E.2d 221 (1955).
" The plaintiff could, however, establish an out-of-state domicile and bring
an action in another state.
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Many other states have statutory provisions for divorce after a
designated separation period. Some are more liberal than North
8
Carolina," and some require that the separation be voluntary.
Seven states have statutes which are like, or are very similar to, the
North Carolina statute. 9 None of these states seems to have had
the interpretation problems which have plagued the North Carolina
court in regard to separation by mutual consent. Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas and Washington have explicitly held that mutual consent is not necessary."
Idaho and Kentucky have implicitly
agreed. 2 Nevada, whose statute provides for divorce after a separation in the trial court's discretion, also has held that mutual consent is not necessary. 2 There have been no cases construing Virginia's recently-passed statute.
In view of the glaring inconsistency presented by the Byers case
and those following it on the one hand, and the Moody case on the
other hand, it would seem that the time has come again to look to
the General Assembly and say, "Your move."
LAWRENCE

T.

HAMMOND, JR.

'7 Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §25-312 (1956) provides that a divorce shall
be granted when husband and wife have been separated five years for any
reason.
.8 Dm. CODE ANN. § 13-1522 (Supp. 1960) ; D.C. CODE § 16-403 (1961);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1957); Wis STAT. ANN. § 247.07 (1957).
Apx STAT. ANN. §34-1202 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE §32-610

(1948); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.020 (1959); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:301
(1951) ; Trx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 4629 (1960) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 29-91
(1960) ; WASH. Rnv. CODE § 26.08.020 (1961). These states permit absolute divorce after a specified period of separation. Mutual consent does not

appear in any of these statutes.
20 Brooks v. Brooks, 201 Ark. 14, 143 S.W.2d 1098
(1940); Otis v.
Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946); Robertson v. Robertson, 217
S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Harp v. Harp, 43 Wash. 2d 821, 264
P.2d 276 (1953).
" In Finnegan v. Finnegan, 76 Idaho 500, 285 P.2d 488 (1955), the court
stated that only three things must be proved under the separation statute:
first, that the parties lived separate and apart; second, that there was no
cohabitation; third, that they were separated for the statutory period.
In Colston v. Colston, 297 Ky. 250, 179 S.W.2d 893 (1944), the court
held that the husband could count five years he was in jail into the separation
period and also said that the wife would have been able to count this period
had she brought the action. Thus it is inferable that the wife's intent alone
would have been enough. See also Hale v. Hale, 137 Ky. 831, 127 S.W. 475
(1910).
2 Pearson v. Pearson, 359 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1961).

